[pre-commit.ci] pre-commit autoupdate (#225)

* [pre-commit.ci] pre-commit autoupdate

updates:
- [github.com/Lucas-C/pre-commit-hooks.git: v1.5.4 → v1.5.5](https://github.com/Lucas-C/pre-commit-hooks.git/compare/v1.5.4...v1.5.5)
- [github.com/python-jsonschema/check-jsonschema.git: 0.27.3 → 0.28.1](https://github.com/python-jsonschema/check-jsonschema.git/compare/0.27.3...0.28.1)
- [github.com/adrienverge/yamllint.git: v1.33.0 → v1.35.1](https://github.com/adrienverge/yamllint.git/compare/v1.33.0...v1.35.1)
- [github.com/PyCQA/flake8.git: 6.1.0 → 7.0.0](https://github.com/PyCQA/flake8.git/compare/6.1.0...7.0.0)
- [github.com/PyCQA/flake8.git: 4.0.1 → 7.0.0](https://github.com/PyCQA/flake8.git/compare/4.0.1...7.0.0)
- [github.com/PyCQA/pylint.git: v3.0.3 → v3.1.0](https://github.com/PyCQA/pylint.git/compare/v3.0.3...v3.1.0)

* Bump WPS to v0.19.x series

* [pre-commit.ci] auto fixes from pre-commit.com hooks

for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci

* Merge separate flake8 runs back into one

---------

Co-authored-by: pre-commit-ci[bot] <66853113+pre-commit-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Sviatoslav Sydorenko <sviat@redhat.com>
This commit is contained in:
pre-commit-ci[bot]
2024-05-16 15:39:26 +00:00
committed by GitHub
parent 67a07ebbed
commit 8414fc2457
3 changed files with 61 additions and 108 deletions
+44 -43
View File
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ from urllib.parse import urlparse
import id # pylint: disable=redefined-builtin
import requests
_GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY = Path(os.getenv("GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"))
_GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY = Path(os.getenv('GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY'))
# The top-level error message that gets rendered.
# This message wraps one of the other templates/messages defined below.
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ permissions:
```
Learn more at https://docs.github.com/en/actions/deployment/security-hardening-your-deployments/about-security-hardening-with-openid-connect#adding-permissions-settings.
"""
""" # noqa: S105; not a password
# Specialization of the token retrieval failure case, when we know that
# the failure cause is use within a third-party PR.
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ even if `id-token: write` is explicitly configured.
To fix this, change your publishing workflow to use an event that
forks of your repository cannot trigger (such as tag or release
creation, or a manually triggered workflow dispatch).
"""
""" # noqa: S105; not a password
# Rendered if the package index refuses the given OIDC token.
_SERVER_REFUSED_TOKEN_EXCHANGE_MESSAGE = """
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ This generally indicates a trusted publisher configuration error, but could
also indicate an internal error on GitHub or PyPI's part.
{rendered_claims}
"""
""" # noqa: S105; not a password
_RENDERED_CLAIMS = """
The claims rendered below are **for debugging purposes only**. You should **not**
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ Token request failed: the index produced an unexpected
This strongly suggests a server configuration or downtime issue; wait
a few minutes and try again.
"""
""" # noqa: S105; not a password
# Rendered if the package index's token response isn't a valid API token payload.
_SERVER_TOKEN_RESPONSE_MALFORMED_MESSAGE = """
@@ -105,30 +105,30 @@ Token response error: the index gave us an invalid response.
This strongly suggests a server configuration or downtime issue; wait
a few minutes and try again.
"""
""" # noqa: S105; not a password
def die(msg: str) -> NoReturn:
with _GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY.open("a", encoding="utf-8") as io:
with _GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY.open('a', encoding='utf-8') as io:
print(_ERROR_SUMMARY_MESSAGE.format(message=msg), file=io)
# HACK: GitHub Actions' annotations don't work across multiple lines naively;
# translating `\n` into `%0A` (i.e., HTML percent-encoding) is known to work.
# See: https://github.com/actions/toolkit/issues/193
msg = msg.replace("\n", "%0A")
print(f"::error::Trusted publishing exchange failure: {msg}", file=sys.stderr)
msg = msg.replace('\n', '%0A')
print(f'::error::Trusted publishing exchange failure: {msg}', file=sys.stderr)
sys.exit(1)
def debug(msg: str):
print(f"::debug::{msg.title()}", file=sys.stderr)
print(f'::debug::{msg.title()}', file=sys.stderr)
def get_normalized_input(name: str) -> str | None:
name = f"INPUT_{name.upper()}"
name = f'INPUT_{name.upper()}'
if val := os.getenv(name):
return val
return os.getenv(name.replace("-", "_"))
return os.getenv(name.replace('-', '_'))
def assert_successful_audience_call(resp: requests.Response, domain: str):
@@ -140,13 +140,13 @@ def assert_successful_audience_call(resp: requests.Response, domain: str):
# This index supports OIDC, but forbids the client from using
# it (either because it's disabled, ratelimited, etc.)
die(
f"audience retrieval failed: repository at {domain} has trusted publishing disabled",
f'audience retrieval failed: repository at {domain} has trusted publishing disabled',
)
case HTTPStatus.NOT_FOUND:
# This index does not support OIDC.
die(
"audience retrieval failed: repository at "
f"{domain} does not indicate trusted publishing support",
'audience retrieval failed: repository at '
f'{domain} does not indicate trusted publishing support',
)
case other:
status = HTTPStatus(other)
@@ -154,67 +154,67 @@ def assert_successful_audience_call(resp: requests.Response, domain: str):
# something we expect. This can happen if the index is broken, in maintenance mode,
# misconfigured, etc.
die(
"audience retrieval failed: repository at "
f"{domain} responded with unexpected {other}: {status.phrase}",
'audience retrieval failed: repository at '
f'{domain} responded with unexpected {other}: {status.phrase}',
)
def render_claims(token: str) -> str:
_, payload, _ = token.split(".", 2)
_, payload, _ = token.split('.', 2)
# urlsafe_b64decode needs padding; JWT payloads don't contain any.
payload += "=" * (4 - (len(payload) % 4))
payload += '=' * (4 - (len(payload) % 4))
claims = json.loads(base64.urlsafe_b64decode(payload))
def _get(name: str) -> str: # noqa: WPS430
return claims.get(name, "MISSING")
return claims.get(name, 'MISSING')
return _RENDERED_CLAIMS.format(
sub=_get("sub"),
repository=_get("repository"),
repository_owner=_get("repository_owner"),
repository_owner_id=_get("repository_owner_id"),
job_workflow_ref=_get("job_workflow_ref"),
ref=_get("ref"),
sub=_get('sub'),
repository=_get('repository'),
repository_owner=_get('repository_owner'),
repository_owner_id=_get('repository_owner_id'),
job_workflow_ref=_get('job_workflow_ref'),
ref=_get('ref'),
)
def event_is_third_party_pr() -> bool:
# Non-`pull_request` events cannot be from third-party PRs.
if os.getenv("GITHUB_EVENT_NAME") != "pull_request":
if os.getenv('GITHUB_EVENT_NAME') != 'pull_request':
return False
event_path = os.getenv("GITHUB_EVENT_PATH")
event_path = os.getenv('GITHUB_EVENT_PATH')
if not event_path:
# No GITHUB_EVENT_PATH indicates a weird GitHub or runner bug.
debug("unexpected: no GITHUB_EVENT_PATH to check")
debug('unexpected: no GITHUB_EVENT_PATH to check')
return False
try:
event = json.loads(Path(event_path).read_bytes())
except json.JSONDecodeError:
debug("unexpected: GITHUB_EVENT_PATH does not contain valid JSON")
debug('unexpected: GITHUB_EVENT_PATH does not contain valid JSON')
return False
try:
return event["pull_request"]["head"]["repo"]["fork"]
return event['pull_request']['head']['repo']['fork']
except KeyError:
return False
repository_url = get_normalized_input("repository-url")
repository_url = get_normalized_input('repository-url')
repository_domain = urlparse(repository_url).netloc
token_exchange_url = f"https://{repository_domain}/_/oidc/mint-token"
token_exchange_url = f'https://{repository_domain}/_/oidc/mint-token'
# Indices are expected to support `https://{domain}/_/oidc/audience`,
# which tells OIDC exchange clients which audience to use.
audience_url = f"https://{repository_domain}/_/oidc/audience"
audience_resp = requests.get(audience_url)
audience_url = f'https://{repository_domain}/_/oidc/audience'
audience_resp = requests.get(audience_url, timeout=5) # S113 wants a timeout
assert_successful_audience_call(audience_resp, repository_domain)
oidc_audience = audience_resp.json()["audience"]
oidc_audience = audience_resp.json()['audience']
debug(f"selected trusted publishing exchange endpoint: {token_exchange_url}")
debug(f'selected trusted publishing exchange endpoint: {token_exchange_url}')
try:
oidc_token = id.detect_credential(audience=oidc_audience)
@@ -229,7 +229,8 @@ except id.IdentityError as identity_error:
# Now we can do the actual token exchange.
mint_token_resp = requests.post(
token_exchange_url,
json={"token": oidc_token},
json={'token': oidc_token},
timeout=5, # S113 wants a timeout
)
try:
@@ -246,9 +247,9 @@ except requests.JSONDecodeError:
# On failure, the JSON response includes the list of errors that
# occurred during minting.
if not mint_token_resp.ok:
reasons = "\n".join(
f"* `{error['code']}`: {error['description']}"
for error in mint_token_payload["errors"]
reasons = '\n'.join(
f'* `{error["code"]}`: {error["description"]}'
for error in mint_token_payload['errors']
)
rendered_claims = render_claims(oidc_token)
@@ -260,12 +261,12 @@ if not mint_token_resp.ok:
),
)
pypi_token = mint_token_payload.get("token")
pypi_token = mint_token_payload.get('token')
if pypi_token is None:
die(_SERVER_TOKEN_RESPONSE_MALFORMED_MESSAGE)
# Mask the newly minted PyPI token, so that we don't accidentally leak it in logs.
print(f"::add-mask::{pypi_token}", file=sys.stderr)
print(f'::add-mask::{pypi_token}', file=sys.stderr)
# This final print will be captured by the subshell in `twine-upload.sh`.
print(pypi_token)